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Abstract
We characterize the joint optimal implementation of macroprudential and monetary
policies in a New Keynesian model where endogenous supply-side nancial frictions gen-
erate inationary credit spreads. State-contingent macroprudential interventions help to
stabilize volatile spreads, and substantially alter the transmission of optimal monetary
policy under both discretion and commitment. In normal times, macroprudential poli-
cies replicate the rst-best allocation. In liquidity traps, nancial interventions remove
the zero lower bound restriction on the nominal policy rate, thus minimizing output costs
following both deationary (inationary) demand (nancial) shocks. Discretionary and
commitment policies with macroprudential taxes deliver equivalent welfare gains.
JEL Classi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The zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates has severely impeded upon the e¤ectiveness
of monetary policy during the recent liquidity trap episodes that have lingered since the Great
Recession. Such challenges to traditional interest rate policy have called for the implementation of
supplementary unconventional scal and monetary policies aimed at minimizing the social costs of
macroeconomic uctuations. Most of the literature has so far focused on increases in government
spending (Eggertsson (2011) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011)), exible adjustments
in consumption and/or labour taxes (Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013) and Mertens and
Ravn (2014)), and unconventional monetary policies involving credit easing and direct central
bank lending (Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011)). Less attention has
been given to the normative implications of corrective nancial policies, also referred to as macro-
prudential interventions, especially in state-contingent liquidity traps. Our paper lls this gap by
developing a simple theoretical New Keynesian model that examines the stabilization roles of state-
dependant macroprudential interventions - taking the form of private asset (deposit) taxation - in
response to both demand-driven and supply-side-driven liquidity traps.
We characterize the optimal monetary-macroprudential policy mix under both discretion and
commitment in a stylized textbook New Keynesian model à la Galí (2015). The basic framework
is modied for: i) an inationary credit spread arising from an endogenous supply-side collateral
constraint and rm default risk; ii) nancial (macroprudential) taxes; and iii) occasionally binding
lower bound restrictions on the e¤ective nominal interest rates faced by the economic agents.
Our paper sheds new positive and normative insights to the ongoing debate around the role of
unconventional nancial policies, as well as to the benets of macroprudential and monetary policy
coordination. We argue that nancial taxes should be activated in a state-dependent fashion based
on the nature of the shock distorting the economy. Access to nancial taxation substantially
alters the transmission of optimal monetary policy under both discretion and commitment, and
signicantly alleviates the severity of liquidity trap episodes. Even in more normal times, when
monetary policy is not constrained by the ZLB, we prove that variations in the macroprudential tax
can replicate the rst-best allocation by solving the policy trade-o¤s emerging from the existence
of the cost-push nancial frictions. In addition, relative to the restricted regime involving only
monetary policy, unconstrained optimal time-consistent (discretionary) and Ramsey (commitment)
policies with macroprudential interventions produce identical welfare gains in response to both
deationary demand shocks and inationary nancial shocks. Thus, commitment policies are of
secondary importance so long as the policy maker can optimally alter the macroprudential tax on
loanable funds - deposits.
In the simple framework we use, rms have to borrow in advance to nance their working-capital
needs. Such borrowing constraint gives rise to an inationary cost channel e¤ect due to the tight
connection between borrowing costs and marginal production costs.1 Compared to the benchmark
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) frictionless monetary policy cost channel model, in our setup the loan
rate relates to both the nominal policy rate, and to an endogenous nance premium that arises due
to the possibility of rm default. Credit default risk, the nance premium and consequently the
lending rate are positively related to the inationary marginal production costs that, in turn, are
1On the importance of the working-capital (credit) cost channel in explaining business cycle uctuations, and
the missing deationphenomenon observed during the Great Recession, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt
(2015).
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proxied by the loan to GDP and leverage ratios.2 Intuitively, and in the absence of shocks, higher
levels of productivity are associated with raised marginal costs, higher levels of debt and inated
borrowing costs (as measured by credit risk and the ensuing nance premium). This nancial
market supply-side friction leads to a distorted long-run allocation, and to ine¢ cient economic
dynamics, both of which justify macroprudential interventions. Although we share the view of
Farhi and Werning (2016) and Korinek and Simsek (2016) regarding the importance of nancial
asset taxes in alleviating credit market ine¢ ciencies and liquidity traps, the source of distortion
in our framework is of a supply-side nature rather than an aggregate demand externality. In
particular, the ine¢ ciency here stems from rm default risk and the endogenous credit spread that
are inationary, and that exacerbate macroeconomic uctuations unless unconventional measures
are implemented. The mechanism that links between leverage, risk, spreads, ination and output
is referred to as the risk-adjusted credit cost channel or simply as the credit cost channel.
In face of cost-push nancial shocks that directly raise credit spreads and thus ination through
the credit cost channel, unrestricted optimal policy necessitates an equal reduction in both the
tax rate on private nancial assets (deposits) and the nominal risk-free policy (deposit) rate. In
this way, the e¤ective nominal deposit rate faced by households, adjusted for the nancial tax,
is completely stabilized at its long-run positive level. The lower bound constraint on the e¤ec-
tive nominal deposit rate is therefore entirely removed with the rst-best allocation attained at
all times. This bliss outcome holds regardless of whether the economy is in a liquidity trap or
not, and does not require any policy commitments. Interestingly, despite the inationary nature
of the nancial shock, restricted optimal monetary policy under commitment triggers the ZLB due
to the large ine¢ cient and persistent slump in output.3 Under unrestricted optimal policy with
macroprudential interventions, the nominal policy rate can freely uctuate so long as the tax rate
moves correspondingly. In fact, the macroprudential subsidy allows the policy maker to set a neg-
ative nominal interest rate, which, in combination, limit cost-push inationary pressures as well
demand-pull ination that would transpire in the absence of nancial policies. Furthermore, in
the presence of a cash-in-advance constraint, this optimal expansionary macroprudential-monetary
policy mix satises the households no-arbitrage condition between deposits and cash-nanced con-
sumption. Negative nominal deposit rates and nancial subsidies echo some of the non-standard
policy measures undertaken by several central banks in advanced economies.
Following adverse demand shocks to the real rate of interest that push prices and output in the
same direction, the nancial tax stands out as the most e¤ective policy instrument. Away from
the liquidity trap, unrestricted time-consistent optimal policy calls for a nancial tax hike and no
change in the nominal policy rate. Intuitively, raising the tax on deposits induces households to save
less and consume more through a standard intertemporal substitution e¤ect. The improvement in
aggregate demand, associated with the demand-driven increase in borrowing costs, helps to secure
full price stability via the standard demand and credit cost channels.4 In contrast, lowering the
2 In this simple model without physical capital accumulation nor housing, it is the rms output that serves as
collateral. Leverage is therefore measured as the total cost of debt to output ratio.
3See also Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim and Zakrajek (2017) who show that rms with limited internal liquidity and
high leverage signicantly increased prices in response to the 2008 nancial market crash that corresponded with a
steep output contraction and extremely high credit spreads.
4A procyclical reaction of borrowing costs relative to GDP following demand-driven shocks is accordant with the
models of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), De Fiore and Tristani (2013) and Eggertsson, Juelsrud, Summers and Wold
(2019). In fact, the latter also show that demand shocks resemble the situation further into the crisis (since 2011),
wherein loan rates have reached historical low levels. In contrast, nancial shocks in their model and ours always
produce a countercyclical response of credit spreads, and resemble more the onset of the nancial crisis.
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nominal policy rate in response to a contractionary demand shock creates greater price instability by
amplifying deationary pressures via the credit cost channel. Such policy is therefore sub-optimal
as it worsens the trade-o¤ between output and ination; a key feature in cost channel models.
Optimal policy is conducted solely with the macroprudential tax.
In a liquidity trap induced by a large negative demand disturbance, optimal policy warrants
a hike in the nancial tax rate and a more modest increase in the nominal policy rate. Such
policy combination lowers the e¤ective nominal and real interest rates, which, in turn, limit the
shrinkage in GDP. At the same time, the monetary contraction lifts borrowing costs, and generates
a su¢ cient cost-push inationary force that fosters price stability. These qualitative results hold
under both discretion and commitment policies. Both regimes with macroprudential interventions
yield an analogous welfare gain relative to the constrained optimal monetary policy plan, despite
marginal di¤erences in the implied optimal dynamics that emerge due to policy promises under
commitment. The recent attempts by the European Central Bank (ECB) to lower deposit rates
by paying negative rates on bank reserves are consistent with the implications of a higher and
inationary tax on deposits that we advocate for in this model when the liquidity trap is demand-
driven.5
Our model benets from nesting the prototypical New Keynesian model as a particular case,
and from a tractable introduction of nancial frictions, macroprudential taxes and occasionally
binding ZLB constraints to an otherwise standard Ravenna and Walsh (2006)-type cost channel
setup. This stylized framework enables us to derive analytical optimal target rules, and to examine
the normative and positive properties of unconventional taxation policies. The small-scale nature
of the model allows for a transparent analysis of macroprudential and monetary policy interactions
under both time-consistent and Ramsey plans derived using the linear-quadratic approach. Cúrdia
and Woodford (2016), for example, also develop a simple, yet insightful, New Keynesian model with
nancial frictions to examine the optimal conduct of monetary policy, but posit a reduced-form
intermediation technology to justify the existence of credit spreads. This modeling choice is in
contrast to our paper, where borrowing costs are endogenous. More closely related to our paper
are those of Demiral (2009) and De Fiore and Tristani (2013), who also derive a micro-founded
risk premium, yet focus solely on optimal monetary policy away from liquidity traps. In our paper,
we concentrate on the transmission mechanisms of nancial and demand shocks accounting for
imperfect credit markets and the lower bound, and aim to provide a deeper understanding on how
unconventional nancial tax policies should react to such disturbances.
The paper is related to the literature that examines the e¤ects of nancial recessions and the
joint optimal implementation of monetary and macroprudential policies (see Collard, Dellas, Diba
and Loisel (2017), De Paoli and Paustian (2017) and Silvo (2019), among others). However, these
papers abstract from the lower bound, implying di¤erent state-contingent policy implications in
relation to ours. Optimal tax policies when interest rates are at the zero bound have been studied
in the New Keynesian models of Eggertsson and Woodford (2006) and Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and
Teles (2013). The former illustrate how consumption taxation can be used to partially o¤set the
adverse e¤ects of the policy rate reaching the ZLB, while the latter show that adjusting commodity
taxes can circumvent the zero bound constraint and always attain the rst-best outcome. We
also emphasize the need for tax exibility to neutralize various shocks, although our motivation is
di¤erent. First, our focus is on the short-run cyclical properties of nancial taxation as opposed
5Conti, Neri and Nobili (2017) nd that adverse aggregate demand shocks have been the most important contrib-
utors to the dis-ination and the lower real GDP growth experienced in the Eurozone since 2014.
4
to more conventional labour and consumption taxes. Second, we highlight the role of supply-side
nancial frictions, which prove to be imperative to the state-dependant optimal policy plans. In a
recent contribution, Correia, De Fiore, Teles and Tristani (2019) show that credit subsidies to rms
can prevent the economy from entering a liquidity trap. Unlike their classic monetary economy
framework, we develop a New Keynesian model with an explicit analysis of optimal discretionary
versus commitment policies, and study the role of a nancial tax on deposits that directly inuences
the households intertemporal consumption patterns.
Our work is also linked with the literature investigating the multiplier e¤ects of various scal
policies and in particular taxation policies in a liquidity trap and away from it. Away from the ZLB
and in the context of a nancial accelerator-type model, Fernández-Villaverde (2010) shows that
an exogenous tax cut on private assets produces positive e¤ects on output. In contrast, Eggertsson
(2011) demonstrates that savings tax cuts could actually be contractionary, especially in a liquidity
trap. Contributing to these papers, we explore the normative properties of unconventional optimal
taxation policies following both cost-push nancial and deationary demand shocks. To the best
of our knowledge, the welfare and business cycle implications of novel nancial tax policies, and
their interactions with monetary policy during normal and abnormal times, have not been fully
addressed in the literature; especially regarding the impact of this unconventional nancial policy
instrument on the multiple interest rates decisions within a tractable workhorse New Keynesian
model.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the long-run and short-run equilibrium properties. In Section 4, we explain the
parameterization of the model and the solution strategy. In Section 5, we derive the state-contingent
optimal policy target rules and study their dynamics and welfare implications. Section 6 o¤ers some
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by households, a continuum of monopolistic intermediate good (IG)
rms, a nal good (FG) rm, a competitive commercial bank (the bank), and a benevolent public
authority that is responsible for monetary, scal and nancial policies.6 Following the realization
of aggregate shocks, households lend their deposits (private nancial assets / savings) to the bank,
and are paid the after-tax e¤ective deposit rate. The bank uses households deposits in order to
supply working-capital loans to IG rms, and sets the loan rate as a risk premium over the risk-free
nominal policy (deposit) rate. For the going lending rate, IG rms decide on their demand for loans,
set prices subject to Calvo (1983)-type nominal price rigidities, and face end of period idiosyncratic
productivity shocks that give rise to default risk. Using a standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) technology,
the FG rm combines all intermediate goods to produce a homogeneous nal good used only for
consumption purposes. We now turn to a more detailed exposition of the economic environment
and equilibrium properties.
6 In this setup, there is no distinction between the central bank, government and the nancial authority, all of
whom operate under full coordination with the same objective function. All these entities therefore fall under the
category of the public authority, policy makeror social planner.
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2.1 Households














0 Nj;tdj are the total hours supplied to the production sector, and Ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) consumption aggregator of intermediate goods (Yj;t) combined by a perfectly competitive FG






; with  > 1 denoting the constant elasticity of substi-
tution between intermediate goods, and Cj;t = Yj;t for all j 2 (0; 1). The relative consumption de-
mand for intermediate good j is then given by Cj;t = (Pj;t=Pt)






is the aggregate price index such that PtCt =
R 1
0 Pj;tCj;tdj: Moreover,  2 (0; 1) is the discount
factor,  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and ' is the








where Z is the steady state value of the demand shock, Z is the degree of persistence, and 
Z
t
is a random shock distributed as standard normal with a constant standard deviation given by
s:d(Z).7
Households start period t with real wealth Wt: In the assets market, households decide on
money balances (Mt), as well as on one-period safe deposits (Dt). At the start of period t+ 1; real





RDt Dt, where R
D
t is the gross nominal deposit rate, and 
D
t is the tax rate on
deposits. Importantly, Dt serves as a state-contingent nancial policy instrument that can be used
to stabilize the economy following various shocks resulting potentially in liquidity trap episodes.
Note that we could either have Dt > 0; corresponding to a tax, or 
D
t  0 representing a subsidy
to private asset income. In line with Farhi and Werning (2016), we simply refer to Dt as a nancial
tax / subsidy, or as a macroprudential intervention.
Households also receive their wage bill WtNt paid as cash at the beginning of period t+ 1, with
Wt denoting real wages. Cash and salaries are then used to pay for consumption goods (Ct) subject
to the following cash-in-advance constraint,
Ct Mt +WtNt: (3)
Finally, households receive a lump-sum transfer from the public authority (Tt), and all prots from
the production sector (Jt).8 Thus, the ow of funds constraints in real terms are,









RDt Dt +Mt +WtNt   Ct + Jt + Tt: (5)
7Steady state values are denoted by dropping the time subscript.






RDt  1, and taking real wages (Wt), prices (Pt) and nancial taxes (Dt ) as given,














t = Wt; (7)
where t+1  Pt+1=Pt is dened as the gross ination rate. Equation (6) is the Euler equation aug-





that macroprudential interventions directly distort the households intertemporal consumption-
savings pattern. Furthermore, with households deposits used to facilitate working-capital loans
supplied by the nancial intermediary, a tax on deposit returns can also be treated as a tax /
subsidy on bank liquidity. Equation (7) determines the optimal labour supply.
The optimality conditions and ow of funds constraints are written under the assumption that 
1  Dt

RDt  1: This is the lower bound constraint on the e¤ective nominal deposit rate which is
an equilibrium restriction. Without macroprudential policies nor a cash-in-advance constraint, the
non-negativity bound is attached only to the nominal risk-free interest rate (as in Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2011)). However, the actual observed savings rate that enters
the households Euler equation accounts for any potential changes in the nancial tax, and serves
as the opportunity cost to money holdings. Cash, in turn, carries a zero nominal interest rate and
is used to purchase consumption goods subject to (3). Therefore, the e¤ective lower bound that







There is a continuum of measure one of monopolistically competitive IG rms, indexed by j 2 (0; 1) ;
who produce a di¤erentiated good Yj;t using the following linear production function,
Yj;t = "j;tNj;t; (8)
where Nj;t is the employment demand by rm j; and "j;t represents an idiosyncratic shock that
occurs as period t + 1 comes to a close. This shock is distributed uniformly over the interval
(";") with a constant variance and a mean of unity.9 Each rm has to borrow in advance in order
to nance the households wage bill in the subsequent period. Specically, working-capital loans
decided in period t are held in zero-interest bearing cash accounts, and are then used to pay for
the households wage bill at the start of period t+ 1: Loans are paid back with interest at the end
of period t+ 1; with the gross lending rate determined by RLt : Let Lj;t be the amount borrowed by
rm j; then the borrowing constraint is,
WtNj;t  Lj;t: (9)
The pricing decision takes place at the start of date t + 1 and consists of two stages. In the
rst stage, each borrowing producer minimizes the cost of employing labour, taking its e¤ective
9We use the uniform distribution in order to generate a plausible data-consistent steady state credit spread, and
to obtain simple closed-form solutions to the model without loss of generality.
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Lj;t then the rst order






For RLt  1; the borrowing constraint (9) is always binding. This non-negativity restriction on the
equilibrium lending rate represents a no-arbitrage condition ensuring that rms cannot make large
prots by keeping their working-capital loans in the form of zero-interest cash accounts. Therefore,
RLt  1 is the lower bound constraint on the cost of borrowing. In the specic case of RLt = 1;
rms are indi¤erent between keeping their loans in cash accounts and paying back these loans at
the prevailing lending rate. Under this marginal case, rms choose the latter.
In the second stage, each producer chooses the optimal price for its good. Here Calvo (1983)-
type contracts are employed, where a portion of  rms keep their prices xed while a portion of
1   producers reset prices optimally. Denoting P t as the optimal price set by IG producers who































representing the price mark-up, and mct given by (10).
To model credit default, we assume that in each period a fraction t of the rms expected
output (Yj;t) must be pledged as collateral in order to secure working-capital loans. Moreover, the
borrowing rm has the option to run awayand default on its debt. In the good states of nature,
each rm pays back the bank principal plus interest on credit. Default occurs if the rms value
after non-payment is greater than its expected value after repaying back the loan in full,
(1  t)Yj;t > Yj;t  RLt Lj;t; (12)
with (1  t)Yj;t denoting the expected value of the rm after running away, and tYj;t repre-
senting the share of collateralized output the bank is able to retain in case of default. It is further
assumed that t follows the AR(1) shock process,
t = ()
1   t 1 exp (s:d ()  t ) ; (13)
where  2 (0; 1) is the mean value of this fraction,  is the degree of persistence, and t is a white-
noise process with constant standard deviation s:d (). A shock to the probability of collateral
recovery (t) represents a nancial shock in this model, as it directly impacts credit risk at the rm
level as well as bank credit spreads, as shown below.11
10Note that Et"Fj;t is identical across all rms in the pricing decision stage that takes place at the beginning of
period t+ 1; just after the realization of aggregate shocks and before the idiosyncratic shock that occurs at the very
end of the period. Hence, under symmetry, the subscript j can be dropped from the marginal cost and consequently
from the optimal price level derived below.
11Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Tayler and Zilberman (2016) also motivate a similar type of nancial / credit
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The cut-o¤ point is related to aggregate credit shocks, borrowing costs and real wages, and is
identical across all rms.12 As real wages are approximated by the loan to output ratio (with
Yj;t = Nj;t for Et"j;t = 1; and output serving as collateral), then uctuations in rms leverage 
RLt Lj;t=Yj;t

will produce variations in the credit default rate. Specically, higher leverage driven
by increased demand for working-capital loans raise the rmsmarginal costs and translate into
elevated nancial risk. Later in the text we show that this supply-side credit externality leads to
an ine¢ cient level of output in the the long-run, and can destabilize the economy in the short-run.
Thus, macroprudential policies are warranted to alleviate these ine¢ ciencies. Given the uniform






"  " : (15)
2.3 Financial Intermediation
The banking sector is perfectly competitive. The bank raises Dt funds via the households in order
to nance the working-capital requirements of IG rms. The banks balance sheet satises,
Lt = Dt; (16)
where Lt =
R 1
0 Lj;tdj = WtNt is the total lending to the production industry, and Nt =
R 1
0 Nj;tdj:
The loan rate is set at the very beginning period t + 1, just after the realization of aggregate
shocks, but before rms engage in production and pricing decisions. The bank breaks-even from
its intermediation activity, such that the expected income from lending to a continuum of rms
is equal to the total costs of borrowing these funds. The banks expected intra-period zero-prot








where f("j;t) is the probability density function of "j;t. The rst element on the left hand side
is the expected repayment to the bank in the non-default states, while the second element is the
expected return in the default states, measured in terms of collateralized output (tYj;t). The term
RDt Dt is the overall gross interest payment on deposit liabilities. To derive the lending rate, we use




t Lj;t; the production
function (8), divide by Lj;t; and apply the characteristics of the uniform distribution. After some
/ risk shock that directly hits the collateral constraint.
12As we solve explicitly for the risk of default using a threshold condition, the collateral constraint in this model
(12), from which we derive the cut-o¤ point, is always binding.
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> 1 dened as the risk premium, "Mt given by (14), and t determined
by (15). The loan rate is therefore set as a nance premium over the risk-free policy rate due to
the possibility of credit default.
2.4 Public Authority
The public authority targets the short-term risk-free policy rate RDt and the nancial tax rate 
D
t
that respect the ZLB constraint on the e¤ective nominal deposit rate, 
1  Dt

RDt  1: (19)
Furthermore, to maintain the rms no-arbitrage condition between cash holdings and loan repay-
ments, policy must be set such that the cost of borrowing cannot fall below zero,
RLt = tR
D
t  1: (20)




 Wt + dtRDt Dt = Tt: (21)
2.5 Market Clearing









0 "j;tdj; where Nt = Nj;t
in a symmetric equilibrium. Using the distribution properties of the idiosyncratic shocks, which
satisfy
R 1
0 "j;tdj = 1 and have a mean of unity, we obtain the following equilibrium condition,








dj is dened as the usual price dispersion index. Using (10) and (18), the
marginal costs faced by IG rms are,
mct = R
L
t Wt = tR
D
t Wt: (23)
Moreover, for RLt  1 the borrowing constraint (9) is binding and is identical across all rms,
Lt = WtNt = Dt: (24)
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is,
Yt = Ct: (25)
13The cut-o¤ value "Mj;t depends on the state of the economy and is therefore identical across all rms (see (14)).
Similarly, real wages and labour employed by each rm are identical such that the volume of demand-determined
loans is also the same. Thus, the subscript j is dropped in what follows.
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3 Equilibrium
To solve the model, we log-linearize the behavioral equations and the resource constraint around
the non-stochastic, zero ination ( = 1) steady state. Under symmetry, and using the log-linear
versions of (7), (11), (22), (23) and (25), allows to write the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
as, bt = Etbt+1 +  h( + ') Y^t + R^Lt i ; (26)
with   (1  )(1  )=:
The aggregate level of lending is procured from the log-linear versions of (7), (22), (24) and
(25), and is given by,
L^t = (1 +  + ') Y^t: (27)
To derive the loan rate, we rst log-linearize equations (7), (14), (15), (22) and (25) to obtain the






R^Lt + ( + ') Y^t   ^t
i
: (28)
By log-linearizing (18) and using (28), the equation determining the credit spread can be written
as,





R^Dt + ( + ') Y^t   ^t
i
; (29)
with 	  ("
M+")("M ")
[2"M (" ") ("M ")2] 2 (0; 1) measuring the degree of nancial market imperfections.
The term "M = mc= is the steady state threshold value below which the IG rm defaults
(see (10) and (14)), where mc = (  1) =  (pm) 1 from equation (11). The steady state
risk of default is therefore  = (mc=) "" " while the long-run credit spread is R
L=RD = ; with








(1  D) : (30)
Equations (28) and (29) show that the credit spread increases with aggregate demand, the policy
rate, and in response to an adverse nancial shock. Intuitively, a rise in the demand for goods, all
else equal, raises the rms demand for external working-capital nance used to support production.
With production pinning down the level of collateral, higher leverage elevates the rms marginal
costs, the probability of default and thus the credit spread charged by the bank. Furthermore, a
rise in R^Dt pushes up R^
L
t through a standard monetary policy cost channel e¤ect. In the absence
of the nancial friction, 	 = 0, the loan rate tracks only the risk-free policy rate, R^Lt = R^
D
t ; as
in the basic cost channel framework of Ravenna and Walsh (2006). Also, an exogenous decline
in the collateral recovery rate, ^t < 0; translates directly to a hike in default risk, leading to a
higher credit spread. Finally, observe that from (27), (28) and (29), the credit spread and risk are
positively related to variations in the loan to GDP ratio as ( + ') Y^t = L^t   Y^t. Contributing to
Cúrdia and Woodford (2016), who employ a reduced-form credit spread function in an otherwise
standard New Keynesian setup, the positive relationship between loans (or the loan to GDP ratio),
risk and the credit spread in our setup is micro-founded, and does not hamper upon the analytical
tractability of the model.
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Long-run output is calculated from the steady state versions of equations (7), (11), (22), (23)










where Y +' is the long-run marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours worked.
The unconstrained rst-best allocation, absent of nancial frictions and the price mark-up, corre-
sponds to Y +' = 1: This e¢ ciency condition can be supported through the implementation of the
following long-run corrective hypothetical macroprudential subsidy,
D;I = 1  (pm) 

< 0; (32)
where superscript I denotes unrestrained rst-best policy. Under standard parameterization with
 < 1 < (pm)  and pm;  > 1; a subsidy on private nancial assets can therefore completely cir-
cumvent both the nancial friction stemming from ex-ante default, and the price mark-up resulting
from monopolistic competition in the deterministic steady state. The negative relationship between
output (Y ) and the loan rate (RD = =
 
1  D) arising from the risk-adjusted cost channel
generates an additional degree of freedom that enables the policy maker to directly intervene in
the credit markets and consequently eliminate steady state distortions using a macroprudential
subsidy.
However, this theoretical unconstrained rst-best policy is not feasible as it must be accom-
panied by a negative loan rate. Specically, substituting (32) in (30) and using the steady state
equation for RL yields RL = RD = (pm) 1 < 1 for  > 1. Such outcome violates the rms
no-arbitrage condition between loan repayments and storing loans in zero-interest bearing cash
accounts. As optimal policy in the deterministic steady state pushes the loan rate to non-viable
negative territory, the constrained-e¢ cient long-run policy that respects the non-negativity con-
straint on borrowing costs is obtained by setting RD = 1: Combining (30) with RD = 1 results
in,
D;II = 1  

< 0; (33)
with superscript II standing for the constrained-e¢ cient long-run policy and
D;I  > D;II .
In contrast to the dissolute rst-best policy, the more modest and restricted nancial subsidy is
feasible, and serves as a natural policy instrument that can remove the long-run ine¢ ciency induced
by the supply-side credit friction,  = f ( ()) : A higher value of  (or a lower ) calls for a larger
nancial subsidy which helps to alleviate the credit externality by lowering the cost of loanable
funds. Importantly, the implementation of the constrained-e¢ cient nancial policy enables the
public authority to set a negative policy rate, RD =  1 < 1; which together with D;II < 0; satisfy
also the households no-arbitrage condition between deposits and cash-nanced consumption, i.e., 
1  D;IIRD =  1. In this way, there exists a single combined policy implementation of the
nancial tax and the nominal policy rate set to their e¤ective lower bounds. This policy prescription
represents a modied Friedman (1969) rule. Without seeking a rate of deation as implied by the
original Friedman proposal, zero e¤ective savings and loan rates can be accomplished through
the enactment of nancial subsidies. Unconventional macroprudential interventions thus provide
a rationale for adopting a prolonged negative nominal deposit rate; a policy measure that echoes
some of the recent practices undertaken by several central banks in advanced economies.
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To capture the ZLB constraint on the e¤ective savings rate in the short-run, we log-linearize
(19) to obtain,
R^Dt   ^Dt   rd; (34)
with rd =   (   1) denoting the steady state net real rate of interest expressed in log-deviations,
and ^Dt = ln
(1 Dt )
(1 D) . The other ZLB restriction in this model ensures that the loan rate cannot be
negative. Log-linearizing (20) and the expression for the risk premium (t) yields the lower bound







( + ') Y^t   ^t
i
  rl; (35)
where rl      1  D 1   1 is the long-run net loan rate. Notice that in steady state
where each variable satises X^t = 0; the tax level that brings the loan rate to its ZLB is set
to
 
1  D 1   1 = 0 or D;II = 1    1; as suggested by the constrained-e¢ cient policy
(33). Consequently, a macroprudential subsidy in steady state brings the economy closer to its
constrained-e¢ cient long-run equilibrium.
To simplify the subsequent optimal policy analysis in the short-run, we examine the normative
policy implications following large shocks that cause R^Dt and potentially R^
D
t   ^Dt to hit their lower
bounds, but not signicant enough to drive R^Lt to its oor. The analysis below is therefore conducted
with one occasionally binding constraint. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, both
deposit and lending rates have been hovering at historically low levels. Despite the downward
pressures placed on borrowing costs, especially in response to adverse demand-driven disturbances,
the data does not suggest loan rates being set to their e¤ective lower bounds (see also Eggertsson,
Juelsrud, Summers and Wold (2019)). Lending rates have remained consistently elevated relative
to the policy rate and the various risk-free market savings rates.14
Substituting (29) in (26), and log-linearizing (6), the model can then be expressed in terms of
the following equations,
bt = Etbt+1 + 
(1 	)
h
R^Dt + ( + ') Y^t  	^t
i
; (36)
Y^t = EtY^t+1    1

R^Dt   ^Dt   Etbt+1   r^nt  ; (37)
with r^nt  Z^t EtZ^t+1 dened as the natural rate of interest that is a function only of the preference
shock. Equation (36) is the extended NKPC establishing the short-run aggregate supply (AS)





and the nancial shock, ^t. The nancial shock, which has a structural interpretation in our model
as explained above, manifests itself in a direct cost-push or supply-side disturbance without altering
14The model could be solved with two occasionally binding constraints. However, the theoretical prospect of R^Lt
hitting its lower bound acts as mere amplication mechanism following only negative demand shocks that produce a
procyclical relationship between credit spreads and GDP (see also Eggertsson, Juelsrud, Summers and Wold (2019)).
On the other hand, an adverse nancial shock inherent in a lending rate spike can be completely contained with an
appropriate combination of state-contingent monetary and nancial subsidy policies. In other words, optimal policy
results in R^Lt being stabilized at its long-run positive level. Therefore, little economic insight is gained from the
introduction of the short-run non-negativity constraint on the loan rate.
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the e¢ cient level of output.15 Moreover, the cost-push component of the nancial friction and the
credit shock reect the nature of the risk-adjusted credit cost channel, in which higher risk and credit
spreads push up marginal costs and thus ination. These inationary pressures arise independently
from the direct monetary policy cost channel e¤ect linking R^Dt to bt: While the direct e¤ect of an
increase in R^Dt is to raise bt; the overall impact, that takes into account the standard demand
channel of monetary policy, is calculated by @bt
@R^Dt
= (1 	)   (1 	) (+') or @bt@R^Dt =   (1 	) ' < 0:
Conditional on ination expectations, a rise in the nominal policy rate therefore lowers ination,
with a higher 	 amplifying the decline in bt following the monetary contraction.
Equation (37) is the Euler equation that determines the aggregate demand (AD) schedule,
augmented for the preference shock and the nancial tax. Observe that a lower tax on deposits
increases desired savings such that in equilibrium output falls more than in the absence of tax
changes. Nevertheless, in response to inationary shocks, implementing a macroprudential subsidy
can act to stabilize ination and consequently be welfare improving. The optimal state-contingent
policy plans against nancial and demand shocks are investigated later in the text.
A novel aspect of our model is that the nance premium and consequently the loan rate are
driven primarily by the elements of the marginal cost (see equations (28) and (29)). Therefore,
output or debt, both of which are proxies for the marginal cost, largely determine the credit
spread, and provide an additional channel through which monetary policy as well as state-contingent
nancial tax policies alter borrowing costs and the economic activity. This mechanism is referred
to as the risk premium channel that operates through the wider credit cost channel linking the loan
rate to ination and output. The term that measures the degree of nancial market imperfections
and that quanties the risk-adjusted credit cost channel is given by 	 or (1 	) 1 ; which are
negatively correlated to the fraction of collateralized output received in case of default (). Indeed,
our model nests the frictionless cost channel framework of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) by setting
	 = 0 and ^Dt = 0; 8t, as well as the Galí (2015) textbook New Keynesian setup by ignoring the
term  (1 	) 1 R^Dt in equation (36) and setting again 	 = 0 and ^Dt = 0; 8t:













such that for a given





; conditions (34), (35), (36) and (37) are
satised.
4 Parameterization and Solution Strategy
Although most of our results are shown analytically, in order to illuminate the implications of
the state-contingent optimal policies for welfare and economic dynamics, we also solve the model
numerically. We employ parameterization largely used in the New Keynesian literature. The
parameter values are summarized in Table 1 and serve as the baseline calibration of the model.
15 In the absence of aggregate productivity shocks, the e¢ cient level of output is equal to unity. Moreover, without
the nancial friction (	 = 0), the cost-push nancial shock disappears from the model. Indeed, it is the nancial
market imperfection that gives rise to the inationary cost-push shock in this framework.
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Value Description
 0.994 Discount factor
 1.00 Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution
' 0.50 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply
Z 1.00 Average preference shock value
 6.00 Elasticity of demand for intermediate goods
 0.80 Degree of price stickiness
" 1.20 Idiosyncratic productivity shock upper range
" 0.80 Idiosyncratic productivity shock lower range
 0.97 Fraction of collateral seized in default states
Z 0.90 Degree of persistence - Demand shock
 0.90 Degree of persistence - Financial shock
s:d(Z) 0.01 Standard deviation - Demand shock
s:d() 0.05 Standard deviation - Financial shock
Elaborating on some of the unique parameters to this framework. The subjective discount factor
is set to  = 0:994; while the nancial tax in the benchmark case is D = 0: The implied long-run
risk-free interest rate for this parameterization is 2:4 percent, consistent with the low interest rates
environment that predated the Great Recession. Furthermore, we set the range of the idiosyncratic
shock to (0:8; 1:2); and the fraction of output received in case of default to  = 0:97: These values,
together with a price mark-up of 20 percent ( = 6) and ' = 0:5, yield an annual credit spread
of  = 2:04 percent and a loan to GDP ratio of 82:41 percent. These nancial market estimates
roughly correspond with the long-run U.S. data.
As for the main shocks examined in our paper, we x the persistence parameters governing the
evolution of nancial and demand shocks,  and Z ; both to 0:90; while the standard deviations
associated with these shocks are s:d() = 0:05 and s:d(Z) = 0:01; respectively. Our shock mo-
ments are within range of the calibrated values obtained in Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim and Zakrajek
(2017) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) - for nancial shocks; and Eggertsson (2011) - for demand
shocks. Finally, to quantitatively solve the model with occasionally binding constraints, we imple-
ment the piecewise-linear methodology developed in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), and conrm
the results using Holdens (2016) algorithm for the perfect foresight solution.
5 Optimal Macroprudential Interventions
The presence of nominal rigidities, the supply-side credit distortions and the various shocks gen-
erate ine¢ cient economic dynamics. Moreover, as shown above, in the deterministic steady state
macroprudential interventions cannot fully correct for the long-run price mark-up friction despite
being able to o¤set the credit externality. As our main focus is on nancial taxation and its inter-
action with monetary policy in the short-run, we introduce a labour subsidy that can eliminate all
average distortions.16 Therefore, we take a second-order approximation of the households ex-ante
16Such scal policy instruments may not be available for stabilizing credit frictions, ination and output in a state-
contingent fashion. However, Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013) show that the implementation of commodity
taxes result in an e¢ cient equilibrium, thereby circumventing the ZLB problem of monetary policy. Unlike their
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utility function around the e¢ cient deterministic steady state. The public authoritys objective


























Lt = ^2t + #Y^ 2t ; (39)
where #  =;    (1 + ') and   (1  )(1  )=.
We now follow the linear-quadratic approach employed in Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) in order
to characterize optimal monetary and macroprudential policies subject to the unique lower bound
constraints of our model. The optimal policy analysis considers both discretionary (time-consistent)
and commitment (Ramsey) policies.
5.1 Optimal Policy under Discretion
Under discretion, the social planner takes private sector expectations as given when solving its opti-
mization problem. Each period, the policy maker chooses bt, Y^t, R^Dt and ^Dt to maximize its objec-
tive function (38) subject to the constraints (34)-(37), taking r^nt ,^t and
nbt+i; Y^t+i; R^Dt+i; ^Dt+io1
i=1









bt   Etbt+1   
(1 	)
h




Y^t   EtY^t+1 + R^Dt   ^Dt   Etbt+1   r^nt i  ^3;t h R^Dt + ^Dt   rdi ;
where ^1;t; ^2;t and ^3;t are the Lagrange multipliers on constraints (36), (37) and (34), respectively.
Under discretion, rst-order conditions are given by,
 bt = ^1;t; (40)
 #Y^t + 
(1 	) ^1;t = ^2;t; (41)

(1 	) ^1;t   ^2;t + ^3;t = 0; (42)
^2;t = ^3;t; (43)
and the slackness condition,
^3;t

 R^Dt + ^Dt   rd

= 0: (44)
paper, our focus is on state-dependant nancial taxation in a model featuring both supply-side credit frictions, and
e¤ective lower bound constraints that stem from the unique nancial market structure of our setup.
17The full derivation of the welfare function is provided in the Appendix.
18Without Total Factory Productivity (TFP) shocks, cyclical output is equal to the output gap. We therefore use
output and output gap interchangeably throughout the rest of the paper.
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5.1.1 Policy Away from the E¤ective Lower Bounds
To highlight the implications of macroprudential interventions, it is useful to start from the exam-
ination of the optimal target rule that emerges from our setup when the public authority has no
access to nancial taxation (^Dt = 0; 8t), and when constraint (34) is slack (^3;t = 0). The optimal
target rule in this case is characterized by,
#Y^t =   (  )
(1 	)bt; (45)
where #  =;    (1 + ') and   (1   )(1   )=; implying  > : The policy maker thus
faces a trade-o¤ between its ination and output gap objectives, and nds it optimal to engineer
a fall in output in order to curb inationary pressures provoked by a cost-push nancial shock.
A marked credit externality (	 > 0) aggravates the variability of output for given movements in
ination. Intuitively, a higher degree of nancial market imperfections (as also measured by a
lower ) escalates the hike in the risk premium and borrowing costs following an adverse nancial
disturbance. This upshot leads to a more pronounced increase in ination, and forces the optimizing
policy maker to adopt a stricter anti-inationary policy stance. The more hawkish policy response
accelerates the contraction in aggregate demand, which, in turn, dampens the rise in the credit
spread and ination via both the standard demand channel of monetary policy as well as the
risk-adjusted credit cost channel.
In the Ravenna and Walsh (2006) frictionless cost channel setup where 	 = 0; the coe¢ cient
on bt in the targeting rule would be ( )# < (1 	) 1 ( )# ; implying a more muted output
adjustment for a given ination deviation relative to our setup. In Ravenna and Walsh (2006),
variability in ination is larger because a rise in R^Dt not only acts to reduce Y^t and bt through a
standard demand e¤ect, but also serves to increase bt and amplify the fall in Y^t via the monetary
policy cost channel. These e¤ects make ination stabilization more costly in terms of output
stability, triggering a monetary policy trade-o¤. In our model, this policy trade-o¤ is intensied
due to the existence of the nancial friction that warrants a more aggressive monetary policy, as
explained above.19
Lets now introduce macroprudential policies. Observe that the presence of nancial taxation
adds the rst-order condition ^2;t = 0, which, together with  (1 	) 1 ^1;t   ^2;t = 0 or ^1;t = 0;
removes the constraints imposed by both the AS and AD schedules (see conditions (40)-(43) when




t thus results in
the rst-best allocation where ination and output are given by bt = 0 and Y^t = 0. The e¢ cient
equilibrium is achieved through macroprudential interventions that eliminate the monetary policy
trade-o¤ induced by the working-capital constraint.
A more direct proof exemplies this point even further. Suppose the policy maker sets bt =
Y^t = 0; 8t: Then, from the AS curve (36) we have R^Dt = 	^t: To satisfy the AD curve (37), the tax
instrument should be set to ^Dt = 	^t  r^nt in order undo any e¤ect of R^Dt on Y^t. Such policy rules
would seem natural candidates to implement the optimal policy allocation. After substituting R^Dt
and ^Dt in (36) and (37), the equilibrium conditions under the above rules can be represented by
19De Fiore and Tristani (2013) also examine optimal monetary policy in a risk-adjusted cost channel model where a
standard costly state verication problem gives rise to an inationary nancial externality. Unlike their model which
studies optimal monetary policy under commitment away from the e¤ective lower bounds, our focus is on optimal





















One solution to (46) is indeed the bliss point where bt = Y^t = 0. This outcome, however, is not
unique, as it can be shown that both eigenvalues of AO cannot lie inside the unit circle. Thus, by the
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions, there exists a multiplicity of equilibria because the number
of eigenvalues inside the unit circle is smaller than the number of non-predetermined variables.
The optimal rst-best allocation is only one solution, and there is nothing in the above tax and
monetary policy rules that drives the economy back to this desired equilibrium.
This shortcoming leads us to consider the following monetary and macroprudential policy rules,
R^Dt = 	^t; (47)
^Dt = 	^t   r^nt   Etbt+1; (48)
where  is a coe¢ cient that measures the strength of the nancial tax response to variations in












1   (   1)

(1 	)    ( 1)(1 	)
#
:
In this case, an optimal macroprudential policy rule with a forward-looking ination target satis-
fying  > 1 guarantees equilibrium uniqueness. For  > 1, the constrained-e¢ cient allocation
is attained as the distinct equilibrium outcome because the eigenvalues of AF lie both inside the
unit circle. Unlike the basic New Keynesian model, the Taylor principle is applied to the macro-
prudential instrument, and is independent of the parameter values. Moreover, for bt = Y^t = 0;
8t; and from an ex-post perspective, the policy rate and the nancial tax satisfy R^Dt = 	^t and
^Dt = 	^t   r^nt : The presence of a threatto adjust the macroprudential tax in reaction to devi-
ations in expected future ination leads to a determinate equilibrium outcome, and is su¢ cient to
rule out any variations in equilibrium. According to the optimal macroprudential policy rule, a rise
in expected ination warrants a more than one-to-one nancial tax cut. The latter, in turn, acts
to raise the real interest rate and thus limit uctuations in output, which would otherwise result in
ine¢ cient variations in ination. In this way, full access to monetary and macroprudential policies,
which include a credible signal to modify taxes in response to any deviations in expected ination,
yields the rst-best time-consistent allocation.
What are the transmission channels of time-consistent optimal policy? Consider rst the e¤ects
of only an adverse nancial shock (^t < 0 and r^
n
t = 0). According to (47), the social planner should
lower the policy rate. In this state of the world, the nominal interest rate curtails the cost-push
inationary impact of the shock, and alleviates the drop in output via a standard intertemporal
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substitution e¤ect. To prevent ination escalating due to the monetary expansion, the macropru-
dential instrument should track the short-run contemporaneous movements in the policy rate (see
(48)). All else equal, a nancial tax cut raises the e¤ective interest rate and incentivizes savings,
both of which result in a short-run GDP contraction. The decline in output attributed to the
macroprudential subsidy exerts downward pressure on borrowing costs and consequently on prices
due to the credit cost channel. Setting ^Dt = R^
D
t   Etbt+1 (in the absence of demand shocks)
keeps the e¤ective savings rate unchanged and thus output at its long-run level. These e¤ects neu-
tralize demand-pull ination. Overall, the implementation of both macroprudential and monetary
policies is crucial for achieving complete ination and output stability against the backdrop of a
nancial recession.
Optimal policy following only an adverse shock to the natural rate of interest (r^nt < 0 and
^t = 0) calls for increasing the nancial tax rate to perfectly o¤set the negative demand shock, and
keeping the nominal policy rate constant (see (47) and (48)). Here, the simple idea is that raising
the nancial tax and keeping the nominal policy rate unchanged lowers the e¤ective real savings
rate, thereby disincentivizing savings and encouraging an expansion in output. The improvement
in aggregate demand then places upward pressure on the rms marginal and borrowing costs,
two intertwined mechanisms that eliminate price deation. In the basic New Keynesian model
without a cost channel, complete output and ination stabilization could be replicated through the
adjustment of only the nominal policy rate, a result also known as the divine coincidence (see
Blanchard and Galí (2007)). However, in our model, lowering R^Dt in response to a contractionary
demand shock creates greater price instability by amplifying deationary pressures via the credit
cost channel. Put di¤erently, monetary policy leads to a short-run trade-o¤ between output and
ination also in the case of demand shocks. Optimal discretionary monetary policy in this state
of the world is thus characterized by R^Dt = 0. In contrast, a nancial tax hike pushes output and
borrowing costs back to their long-run levels and helps to foster full price stability through both
the demand and cost channel e¤ects. Overall, a nancial tax stands out as a natural and sole
policy instrument that can o¤set the friction and policy trade-o¤s generated by the working-capital
constraint. Below we show that time-consistent macroprudential interventions also considerably
alleviate the negative repercussions of a demand-driven liquidity trap.
These results represent the advantages of macroprudential interventions even in more normal
timesand away from liquidity traps. Not only does unrestricted optimal policy completely stabilize
economic shocks and deliver the unique e¢ cient equilibrium, but it also has the benet of generating
a credible signal of reacting to expected inationary pressures in a time-consistent manner.
5.1.2 Policy at the E¤ective Lower Bounds
We now turn to study the role of discretionary state-contingent macroprudential interventions when
the economy enters a liquidity trap. In our framework, the lower bound constraint is imposed on
the e¤ective nominal deposit rate, R^Dt   ^D, which, in turn, may account for the nancial tax.
Consider the rst case where the e¤ective deposit rate is at its lower bound (^3;t > 0), and
where macroprudential policy is initially not used, ^Dt = 0; 8t: The optimal discretionary target
rule in this scenario is,
#Y^t =   (  )
(1 	)bt   ^3;t: (50)
Thus, for a given variation in ination, a tighter constraint on R^Dt =  rd; as measured by ^3;t > 0;
leads to a more substantial fall in output following a deationary demand shock. Once at the ZLB
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and using the slackness constraint (44), the policy rate follows,
R^Dt =  rd; ^3;t > 0: (51)
The equilibrium path for ination and output during the ZLB episode are obtained by substituting
(51) in (36) and (37),
bt = Etbt+1 + 
(1 	)
h
(1 + ') Y^t  	^t   rd
i
; (52)
Y^t = EtY^t+1 + Etbt+1 + r^nt + rd: (53)
The rational expectations equilibrium in a liquidity trap that is instigated by only a zero nominal
interest rate is then given by equations (50), (52) and (53), taking expectations and the AR(1)
shocks as given.
A few results are worth emphasizing. First, at the ZLB and without macroprudential policy,
it is no longer possible to set ination and output to their optimal rst-best levels. Such outcome
would require a negative nominal interest rate when the natural rate falls below zero. Second, the
direct monetary policy cost channel is irrelevant in a liquidity trap as any dynamic e¤ects of R^Dt
disappear from both the AD and AS equations. Third, following a large negative demand shock that
triggers the ZLB, output, the marginal cost and prices plummet. Beyond this direct demand-pull
deationary consequence, the slump in the marginal cost and aggregate demand exerts downward
pressure on credit risk, which, in turn, lowers the lending rate via the risk premium channel.20
The fall in the credit spread then magnies the deationary impact of the shock and deepens the
economic recession by keeping the real policy rate at elevated levels. This amplication e¤ect is
captured by the degree of nancial frictions, 	, as can be inferred from (52), and serves as a cost-
push deationary by-product. Finally, re-arranging (50) after substituting in (52) and (53) reveals
that ^3;t is a negative function of r^
n
t , and a positive function of ^t: Intuitively, a sizeable negative
demand shock that pushes output and ination in the same direction lowers the natural rate of
interest and increases the risk of entering a liquidity trap, hence tightening the ZLB constraint.
In contrast, a positive nancial shock that lowers ination acts to lift the real interest rate and
further depress aggregate demand. Our model therefore gives rise to a variant of the paradox of
toil (as popularized by Eggertsson (2010)), wherein otherwise expansionary supply-side shocks can
paradoxically lead to lower welfare by amplifying deationary pressures and keeping the nominal
policy rate at its e¤ective lower bound. In our setup, this paradox stems from the existence of the
risk-adjusted credit cost channel.
Now suppose the public authority has access to the macroprudential tax. Using conditions
(40)-(43), the optimal target rule with ^3;t > 0 becomes,
#Y^t =  ^3;t: (54)
The nancial tax adds the rst-order condition ^2;t = ^3;t; which together with (42), removes the
policy restriction imposed by the AS curve (^1;t = 0). Complete price stability (bt = 0) is therefore
attained with the introduction of macroprudential policy. To build the intuition for this result,
20Similar to De Fiore and Tristani (2013) and Eggertsson, Juelsrud, Summers and Wold (2019), without credit or
supply-side shocks that lead to a rise in borrowing costs, demand shocks generate a positive comovement between
credit spreads and output.
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we plot the impulse response functions following a sizeable adverse demand shock of magnitude
8s:d(Z); with s:d(Z) = 0:01 remaining constant. The comparison is made between the dynamics
of the model as implied from target rule (50) with ^Dt = 0; 8t (labeled No Macroprud), and the
short-run uctuations arising from the implementation of target rule (54) when ^Dt is set optimally
(labeled With Macroprud). The results are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 - Adverse Demand Shock with Discretionary Policy and the ZLB






















































Note: Figure 1 displays the equilibrium responses to an adverse demand shock under
optimal discretionary policy. Interest rates, ination and the nancial tax rate are
measured in annualized percentage point deviations from steady state. Output is
measured in annualized percentage deviations.
Enacting macroprudential policies renders the policy maker an extra degree of freedom in stim-
ulating aggregate demand by hiking the nancial tax rate that feeds into the households intertem-
poral consumption-savings decision. Full price stability is then fostered by a more modest alteration
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of the nominal policy rate compared to the tax adjustment. In particular, raising ^Dt by around
4:5 percentage points, and increasing the nominal policy rate R^Dt by approximately 2 percentage
points, lowers the e¤ective nominal savings rate (R^Dt   ^Dt ), which, in turn, considerably mitigates
the decline in Y^t: At the same time, raising R^Dt lifts borrowing costs, and generates a su¢ cient
cost-push inationary force that yields complete price stability. Despite the lack of commitment
technology, private agents understand that the social planner has both the incentive and now the
means to deliver zero ination each period without creating any additional output distortions.
Hence, the expected path of the real e¤ective deposit rate tracks the movements of the nominal
e¤ective deposit rate, allowing the public authority to completely stabilize output once the economy
escapes the liquidity trap. The implementation of the state-contingent nancial tax at the ZLB
helps to reduce both the scale and the duration of the downturn relative to the benchmark case
without macroprudential policy.
To obtain the reduced form expressions for Y^t and ^3;t under optimal discretion with nancial
taxation at the ZLB, combine the optimality condition (54) with (34), (36) and (37), and then

















where p satises EtY^t+1 = pY^t: Two key observations emerge from (55) and (56). First, all else
equal, unconstrained discretionary policy with macroprudential interventions eliminates the risk
of entering a liquidity trap following a nancial shock as ^t does not enter neither (55) nor (56).
Intuitively, without ^Dt and away from the ZLB, optimal time-consistent policy in the face of an
adverse nancial shock warrants a rise in R^Dt to tackle the inationary component of the credit
spread (see discussion below equation (45)). Hence, the ZLB constraint is less consequential. With
macroprudential policy, both R^Dt and ^
D
t must fall in order to bring about complete output and
ination stabilization. For bt = 0; 8t; the optimal e¤ective savings rate satises R^Dt   ^Dt =
0; insulating the real economy from the inationary e¤ect that would otherwise follow from the
expansionary monetary policy. Given that the e¤ective deposit rate is optimally set to its positive
steady state value, the ZLB constraint is removed. Second, a large negative demand shock tightens
the lower bound constraint and leads to a drop in aggregate demand even in the presence of
macroprudential policies. Optimal policy then requires a rise in both the nominal policy rate and
the tax rate such that the ZLB constraint on the e¤ective deposit rate is considerably mitigated
(see also Figure 1).
5.2 Optimal Policy under Commitment
This section determines the optimal policy plans under commitment. As shown earlier, away from
liquidity traps, optimal discretionary policies always achieve the rst-best outcome when macro-
prudential policies are activated. Thus, examining optimal commitment policies with access to ^Dt
in more normal timesbecomes redundant. The focus of this section is therefore on credible com-
mitment policies with macroprudential interventions when the e¤ective deposit rate is occasionally
constrained by the ZLB.
Under commitment, the benevolent public authority chooses state-contingent paths for ination,
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output, the nominal policy rate and the nancial tax to maximize its objective function (38) subject














hbt   Etbt+1   (1 	) hR^Dt + (1 + ') Y^t  	^tii
 ^2;t
h
Y^t   EtY^t+1 + R^Dt   ^Dt   Etbt+1   r^nt i  ^3;t h R^Dt + ^Dt   rdi
9=; ;
where ^1;t; ^2;t and ^3;t are the Lagrange multipliers on constraints (36), (37) and (34), respectively.
Under commitment, the resulting rst-order conditions read,
 bt   ^1;t + ^1;t 1 + 1 ^2;t 1 = 0; (57)
 #Y^t + 
(1 	) ^1;t   ^2;t +
1

^2;t 1 = 0; (58)

(1 	) ^1;t   ^2;t + ^3;t = 0; (59)
^2;t = ^3;t: (60)
The complementary slackness condition is,
^3;t

 R^Dt + ^Dt   rd

= 0; ^3;t  0; (61)
where the initial conditions satisfy ^1; 1 = ^2; 1 = ^3; 1 = 0: The optimal state-contingent evo-
lution of the endogenous variables
nbt; Y^t; R^Dt ; ^Dt o is then characterized by the above rst-order
conditions together with constraints (36) and (37), as well as the slackness condition (61). Under
commitment, optimal policy becomes history-dependent as reected by the lagged Lagrange multi-
pliers in (57) and (58). These additional state variables reect promisesthat must be kept from
past commitments.
Demand Shocks.- Figure 2 presents the optimal responses of the key variables of the model
to a negative demand shock of size 8s:d(Z); with the unconditional standard deviation given by
s:d(Z) = 0:01. The joint optimal monetary and macroprudential policy plan under commitment
(labeled Comm with Macroprud) is compared with the corresponding discretionary regime (la-
beled Disc with Macroprud), as well as with the constrained commitment regime that involves
only monetary policy as a stabilization tool (labeled Comm no Macroprud).
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Figure 2 - Adverse Demand Shock with Commitment Policy and the ZLB
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Note: Figure 2 displays the equilibrium responses to an adverse demand shock under
optimal commitment policy with a comparison to the optimal discretionary policy with
macroprudential interventions. Interest rates, ination and the nancial tax rate are
measured in annualized percentage point deviations from steady state. Output is
measured in annualized percentage deviations.
Starting from the examination of optimal monetary policy under commitment (^Dt = 0), a
negative demand shock provokes the policy maker to slash the nominal interest rate and keep it
at its lower bound for 4 periods in order to induce a persistent, yet gradual, economic expansion
from the rst period. At the same time, the interest rate reduction places downward pressure on
ination due to the presence of the risk-adjusted credit cost channel. Compared to Adam and Billi
(2006), the existence of the credit cost channel prompts the public authority to drive output above
its steady state level for a longer period of time, with the objective of dampening the fall in prices.
Because the demand channel dominates the cost channel mechanism, such policy prescription is
optimal. In our environment, deation is amplied due to the drop in both aggregate demand and
the credit spread. As a result, deviations in output and ination persist beyond the life of the
shock. By committing to present and future positive output gaps, the policy maker can mitigate
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the current and expected deationary impact of the demand disturbance, thereby improving the
output gap-ination trade-o¤ already from the period of the shock. The added stimulus to the
system generated by the promise to keep bt and Y^t positive even after the economy escapes the
liquidity trap allows for an earlier lift o¤ of R^Dt from its oor.
21 Overall, the presence of nancial
frictions warrants a rather substantial and much more persistent output boom compared to the
dynamics of output that arises in a standard New Keynesian model without a credit cost channel.
With a credible commitment to adjust both the nominal policy rate and the macroprudential
instrument, the dynamics of output and ination are considerably subdued compared to the case
where ^Dt is not available. In the scenario where the nancial tax is implemented, the adverse
demand shock does not require the nominal policy rate to hit its lower bound. Instead, optimal
policy involves an increase in the tax rate and a more subtle initial hike in the nominal policy rate
such that only the e¤ective savings rate reaches its oor. This policy combination stimulates output
via a standard demand channel, and limits deationary pressures through the credit cost channel
e¤ect. The latter mechanism, in turn, is driven by both the relative rise in R^Dt and Y^t which raise
borrowing costs and consequently ination. Moreover, conditions (57)-(61) reveal that once ^Dt in
accessible, the policy maker commits to future ination as a substitute for the inability to further
lower the e¤ective savings rate. Specically, for ^2;t = ^3;t and ^1;t = 0; promised ination is positive
as bt = ^1;t 1 +  1^2;t 1: Note that compared to the discretionary case with macroprudential
policy, the e¤ective deposit rate is kept at its oor for 2 additional periods under the unconstrained
optimal commitment regime with ^Dt . Importantly, the longer and looser anticipated policy mix,
involving a modest nominal interest rate cut from the third period, dampens the initial decline
in output and ination but requires a small rise in these two variables for a short period of time
in the future. Comparing discretion versus commitment from a welfare perspective, the rst few
periods more cushioned drop in output under the commitment case o¤sets the optimal amount of
costly above-target promised ination and output. Quantitatively, unconstrained commitment and
discretionary policies with macroprudential interventions yield an identical welfare gain of 0:015
percent relative to the constrained commitment policy comprising only of monetary policy.22
A macroprudential tax in a liquidity trap, as we advocate for in this model, is in line with the
recent unconventional policy attempts taken by the ECB to lower e¤ective deposit rates and to
increase credit spreads in light of the persistent low ination experienced in the Eurozone. We show
that a tax on deposits stands out as a natural policy tool to address the ine¢ ciencies associated
with liquidity traps instigated by deationary shocks.
Financial Shocks.- Figure 3 displays the optimal responses of the key variables of the model
to a signicant adverse nancial shock of size 6 s:d(); with s:d() = 0:05 remaining constant.
We compare the optimal commitment policy with monetary policy used as the sole stabilization
instrument (labeled Comm no Macroprud) with the commitment regime involving macropruden-
tial interventions (labeled Comm with Macroprud), as well as with the discretionary case that
also includes macroprudential policy (labeled Disc with Macroprud).
21Applying our calibration values and shock moments to a standard New Keynesian model with the ZLB and no
cost channel (i.e., Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Adam and Billi (2006)), would result in the policy rate being
released from its lower bound after 6 periods, as opposed to 4 periods in our model. This extra simulation is available
upon request.
22The welfare gain is measured in terms of the equivalent permanent increase in consumption. Furthermore, these
welfare gains are the same up to the 8th decimal point. Thus, we comfortably argue that time-consistent and Ramsey
plans with nancial taxation are coequal from a quantitative welfare perspective.
25
Figure 3 - Adverse Financial Shock with Commitment Policy and the ZLB
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Note: Figure 3 displays the equilibrium responses to an adverse nancial shock under
optimal commitment policy with a comparison to the optimal discretionary policy with
macroprudential interventions. Interest rates, ination and the nancial tax rate are
measured in annualized percentage point deviations from steady state. Output is
measured in annualized percentage deviations.
Under constrained commitment with monetary policy, an adverse cost-push nancial shock
requires a cut in the nominal interest rate despite the inationary pressures precipitated by the rise
in the credit spread. This result comes in stark contrast to the constrained discretionary policy
outcome that warrants a hike in the nominal interest rate, as discussed above. Similar to De Fiore
and Tristani (2013), a credit shock that directly raises borrowing costs leads to an ine¢ cient and
entirely undesirable slump in output. The downward pressure on real wages generated by the spike
in ination discourages both labour supply and the demand for consumption goods, resulting in
a persistent contraction in the output gap. A large ine¢ cient credit disturbance therefore sends
the nominal policy rate to its lower bound for 2 periods, with the accommodative monetary policy
helping to smooth the adjustment of output at the expense of short-lived inationary pressures. As
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soon as the economy starts recovering, the social planner promises to generate mild deation in the
future, which helps to alleviate the cost-push inationary force in the rst few periods. Thus, our
model can explain why nominal policy rates have been hovering around their lower bounds also in
response to inationary nancial shocks, as well as the missing deation puzzleobserved during
the Great Recession.23 The peculiar nature of the supply-side nancial shock in our framework
generates both a countercyclical credit spread and a negative comovement between ination and
output.
Under unconstrained commitment policies, direct macroprudential interventions allow for an
unrestricted reduction in the nominal policy rate that, in combination, insulate the economy from
the adverse repercussions of the credit shock. Specically, R^Dt should be lowered one-to-one with
respect to the cut in ^Dt such that the e¤ective savings rate remains unscathed and at its positive
steady state level. In this way, both output and ination are completely stabilized despite the
high credit spread. Notice that while the loan rate is completely stabilized at its long-run positive
value (R^Lt = 0), the credit spread remains elevated due to the sharp fall in R^
D
t . The monetary
expansion directly alleviates the cost-push e¤ects generated by the otherwise higher borrowing
costs, while the nancial tax cut prevents any demand-pull inationary pressures. This optimal
policy prescription holds regardless of whether the economy enters a liquidity trap or not. Further-
more, the implied optimal dynamics from unconstrained Ramsey and time-consistent policies with
macroprudential interventions are identical and yield the same welfare gain of 0:066 percent relative
to the constrained optimal monetary policy commitment case. The availability of unconventional
nancial policies removes the ZLB constraint for monetary policy, and enables the policy maker
to set negative nominal interest rates without violating the households no-arbitrage condition be-
tween deposits and holding cash for consumption purposes. Such policies are not inconsistent with
the practices of some central banks in advanced economies which have set unprecedented negative
nominal interest rates with the aim to stimulate aggregate demand. Our model shows that these
policies are indeed feasible so long as unconventional macroprudential policies are implemented cor-
rectly and in a state-contingent fashion. Finally, while this framework does not explicitly account
for liquidity injections, central banks balance sheet policies or the interest payment on reserves, all
of which facilitate bank liquidity, a macroprudential subsidy to private assets is in line with such
operations.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied the properties of optimal time-consistent and Ramsey macroprudential
policies in the context of a stylized New Keynesian model modied for a credit cost channel,
endogenous credit spreads and e¤ective lower bound constraints. The model sheds new insights
on the stabilization roles and transmission mechanisms of macroprudential interventions both in a
liquidity trap and away from it. We have shown that varying the nancial tax according to the state
of the business and nancial cycles has meaningful e¤ects on the behaviour of key macroeconomic
variables, and substantially alters the transmission of optimal monetary policy under both discretion
and commitment.
The distinctive supply-side nancial frictions highlighted in this paper present an additional
motivation for activating state-contingent macroprudential policies by a¤ording the policy maker
23See also Gilchrist, Schoenle, Sim and Zakrajek (2017) who nd that negative nancial shocks are inationary,
all else equal.
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an extra degree of freedom to pursue its primary mandates. In normal circumstances, macropru-
dential policies solve the policy trade-o¤s that arise due the presence of the credit cost channel, and
help to accomplish full stabilization of output and ination. In a liquidity trap, macroprudential
policies unleash the restrictions imposed on the nominal policy rate, and substantially diminish the
adverse consequences of both negative demand and nancial shocks. Finally, optimal unconstrained
time-consistent policies with macroprudential interventions are remarkably similar to their Ramsey
counterparts. The two unrestricted optimal policy regimes yield an equivalent welfare gain com-
pared to the constrained optimal policy involving only nominal interest rate adjustments. These
results suggest that commitment policies are of secondary importance so long as the policy maker
can optimally alter the nancial tax on loanable funds.
Like Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013) and Correia, De Fiore, Teles and Tristani (2019),
our state-dependent policy recommendations require taxes to be exible and relatively volatile. It is
well known that scal and nancial policy tools are not as exible as monetary policy instruments,
and require a long legislative process until they can actually be executed. The recent Great Reces-
sion, however, has led to somewhat more exibility in terms of implementing scal and nancial
policies, despite the main focus still placed on government spending since the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, and countercyclical regulation associated with the gradual
imposition of Basel III. Either way, we make a normative point that taxes (or nancial policies)
should be at least as proactive as monetary policy, so long as the policy maker can correctly identify
the source and the size of the shock distorting the economy.
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7 Appendix - Welfare Function Derivation (Not for publication)
The derivation of the loss function as presented in the paper strictly follows Woodford (2003) and
Galí (2015). To derive a second-order approximation of the representative utility function, it is
rst useful to clarify some additional notation. For any variable Xt; let X be its steady state value,
~Xt = Xt  X be the deviation of Xt around its steady state, and nally X^t = log(Xt=X) be the log-
deviation of Xt around its corresponding steady state. Using a second order Taylor approximation,
the variables ~Xt and X^ can be related through the following equation,
Xt
X






















; it follows that ~Xt  X
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where Ut (Ct; Zt)  ZtC
1 
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1+' : We start by approximating the utility from
consumption. With the steady state value of the demand shock (Z) equal to 1; the second order
expansion for U(Ct; Zt) yields,





UZ(C; 1) eZt + 1
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UZZ eZ2t + UCZ eZt ~Ct: (64)
Using eZt  bZt; UCC(C; 1) =  UC(C; 1)C 1 and UCZ = UC(C; 1); the above becomes,

















+UZ(C; 1) bZt + 1
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UZZ bZ2t + UC(C; 1) bZtC C^t + 12 C^2t

:
Ignoring the terms Xi for i > 2 yields,
U(Ct; Zt)  U(C; 1)  UC(C; 1)C








UZ(C; 1) bZt + 1
2
UZZ bZ2t  : (65)
We next derive an expression for the disutility from labour. The Taylor expansion for V (Nt; Zt)
gives,
V (Nt; Zt)  V (N; 1) + VN (N; 1) ~Nt + 1
2
VNN (N; 1) ~N
2
t +
+VZ(N; 1) eZt + 1
2
VZZ eZ2t + VNZ eZt ~Nt: (66)
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Applying eZt  bZt, and ignoring the terms Xi for i > 2 results in,



















+VZ(N; 1) bZt + 1
2
VZZ bZ2t + VNZ bZtN N^t + 12N^2t

:
Using VNN (N; 1) = 'VN (N; 1)N 1 and VNZ = VN (N; 1) yields,
V (Nt; Zt)  V (N; 1)  VN (N; 1)N





+VZ(Z; 1) bZt + 1
2
VZZ bZ2t : (67)
Subtracting (67) from (65) gives,
U(Ct; Zt)  U(C; 1)  V (Nt; #t) + V (N; 1) = UC(C; 1)C
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where tip  1UC(C;1)C

UZ(Y; 1) bZt   VZ(N; 1) bZt + 12UZZ bZ2t   12VZZ bZ2t  are terms independent of
policy.















































: Thus, taking expectations
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from both sides yields,
1 =
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 1  p^j;t + 1
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2p^2j;t: (71)

















































1  VN (N; 1)
UC(C; 1)
 bZtY^t + tip: (73)
Note that the steady state labour market equilibrium condition is,
VN (N; 1)
UC(C; 1)






where pm  ( 1) is the price mark-up. The e¢ cient steady state implies that VNUC = Y +' =
MPN = 1: However, as explained in the main text under standard parameterization, the rst-best
optimal macroprudential policy (D;I < 0) would require a non-feasible negative loan rate. As a
result, VHUC < 1 so the rst-best in not attainable with nancial taxation. In order to make our
welfare analysis transparent with a focus on the short-run stabilization roles of macroprudential






In this way, setting N = 1  (pm) eliminates all steady state distortions without violating any of
the lower bound constraints of the model. We can then use VNUC = Y







('+ ) Y^ 2t + tip: (75)
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The next step consists in rewriting varjpj;t as a function of ination. Note that because only a
fraction of  rms keep their prices xed while a portion of 1   producers reset prices optimally.
We can rewrite the expected price for good j as,




(1  ) (Ej;tPj;t   Pj;t 1) : (76)





  (Ej;tPj;t   Pj;t 1)2 : (77)





=  (Pj;t 1   Pj;t 1)2 + (1  ) (P t   Pj;t 1)2 : (78)
Substitute (78) and (76) in (77) to get,
varjpj;t =  (Pj;t 1   Pj;t 1)2 + (1  ) (P t   Pj;t 1)2   (Ej;tPj;t   Pj;t 1)2 ;
or,
varjpj;t =  (Pj;t 1   Pj;t 1)2 + 
(1  ) (Ej;tPj;t   Pj;t 1)
2 ;
or,









































































We measure the welfare benet of a particular optimal policy j as a fraction of the consumption
path under the benchmark optimal monetary policy case that must be given up in order to obtain
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represents the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility under










associated with the benchmark optimal monetary policy regime. Converting the loss function to








var(^t) + (1 + ') var
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Y^t
i
:
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